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THE LOSS OF STATE TAX REVENUE AS A
BASIS FOR STANDING: ECONOMY,




The importance of the law of standing goes beyond the judicial
determination that the constitutional "case or controversy" require-
ments of Article III have been satisfied.' It extends past the "proce-
dural"' 2 realm to resolve significant "substantive"' 3 issues facing
modern society.
Recently, in Wyoming v. Oklahoma, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of standing.4 It determined that Wyoming
had standing to challenge an Oklahoma statute requiring Oklahoma
coal-fired electric generating plants producing power for sale in
Oklahoma to burn a mixture of at least 10% Oklahoma-mined coal.'
* Currently serving on active duty as a Judge Advocate in the United States Air Force.
B.A., 1976, Oklahoma State University; B.A., 1978, M.A., 1983, Oxford University; J.D., 1983,
Georgetown University Law Center;, LL.M. in Environmental Law, 1993, George Washington
University.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1:
The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority .. [and] to Controversies between two or more states.
2. "Procedural law" is defined as "that which prescribes method of enforcing rights or
obtaining redress for their invasion." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1083 (5th ed. 1979).
3. "Substantive law" is that part of law "which creates, defines, and regulates rights ... 
Id. at 1281.
4. 112 S. Ct. 789 (1992). Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joined. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting
opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia joined. See infra IV.D.. Justice
Thomas also filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas
joined.
5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 45 § 939 (Supp. 1988)[hereinafter the Act]:
All entities providing electric power for sale to the consumer in Oklahoma and generat-
ing said power from coal-fired plants located in Oklahoma shall bum a mixture of coal
1
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The Court ruled Wyoming met the requirements for standing since its
severance tax revenues, linked directly to the extraction and sale of
coal, declined as a result of the Oklahoma statute.6
The "procedural" focus of this article's analysis is the loss of state
tax revenue as a basis for standing in interstate disputes. 7 Initially it
reviews the "substantive" history of standing under Article 111.8 Next
it analyzes the three principal cases relied on by the Court in conclud-
ing Wyoming had standing to challenge the Oklahoma statute: Mary-
land v. Louisiana,9 Texas v. Florida,10 and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Organization.1 After discussing the opinion of the
Court in Wyoming,12 the article turns to the complicated interplay of
states' competing economic interests, balanced with the limitations of
the Commerce Clause;13 the goal of efficient energy consumption;
14
and the environmental repercussions of allowing loss of state tax reve-
nue as a basis for standing in interstate disputes.15 The last section
synthesizes the analysis of competing interests against the background
that contains a minimum of ten percent (10%) Oklahoma mined coal, as calculated on
a BTU (British Thermal Unit) basis.
6. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 796-98 (1992).
7. Supra note 4.
8. Supra note 1.
9. 451 U.S. 725 (1981). See infra UI.B.
10. 306 U.S. 398 (1939). See infra III.C.
11. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). See infra M.D.
12. See infra IV.
13. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. See infra V.A.
14. See Jess M. McCarty, Note, Coa; State Protectionism, and the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments: Why Keeping Sears in Illinois Withstands Commerce Clause Scrutiny, But Keeping
Coal Mining Jobs Does Not, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 1119. The choice for midwestern states to
comply with the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (1992), is to install scrub-
bers and bum local high-sulfur coal or import low-sulfur coal from western states and burn it
unscrubbed. The Ilinois Coal Scrubber Act (ICSA) requires utilities to install scrubbers and
seek state approval before making interstate coal purchases. McCarty argues that even if the
1990 CAAA does not preempt state laws, the ICSA is invalid under the dormant Commerce
Clause because it discriminates against interstate commerce. He further urges midwestern states
to re-examine the underlying goals of such statutes and concludes money should be spent on
attracting new industries and retraining workers for new jobs instead of propping up declining
high-sulfur coal industries. See also infra V.B.
15. See Gene R. Nichol Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DuKE
LJ. 1142-43 (1992). Nichol considers the opinion of Justice Scalia in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), as marking a "transformation in the law of standing" "the
law of "judicial control of public officers." Nichol, supra note, at 1142 (citing Louis L. JAFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF AMINiSmTRATIvE ACTION 459 (1965)). Nichol interprets Justice Scalia's
opinion to hold that "legislatively pronounced" "public rights" cannot provide a basis for stand-
ing in federal courts unless they coincide with the Justices' views of discrete, concrete, and tangi-
ble injury. Id. (citing Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2142-46). Lujan denied standing to the environmental
group challenging non-application of the Endangered Species Act overseas because its members,
to show direct injury, demonstrated only an unspecified intent to return to overseas places they
had previously visited. This demonstration did not constitute an "imminent injury." Lujan, 112
S. Ct. at 2135-38. Nichol finds the decision difficult to reconcile with the language and history of
2
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of "generational equity."'1 6 The article concludes that a state's loss of
tax revenue as a "procedural" basis for standing in interstate disputes
must be balanced with the "substantive" policy issues discussed herein
to ensure that the courts strike a proper balance when considering
disputes.
II. HISTORY OF STANDING
A. Overview
To understand the implications of standing for sovereignty one
must step back and review the history behind the standing issue. With
that understanding, the focus can narrow to the loss of state tax reve-
nue as a basis for standing, and Wyoming vs. Oklahoma's impact on
other interstate disputes.
The history of sovereignty foreshadows the modem debate on
standing. The central authority's expansion of standing decreases a
state's sovereignty, by exposing its legislation and policy to legal at-
tack. In the past, if the balance of power rests with the states, the
nation becomes weak, as in Ancient Greece17 and the emerging
United States under the Articles of Confederation.' 8 However, his-
tory shows that when excessive power rests with a strong central au-
thority, people view it as oppresive, as shown in the Mayflower
Article III, injury requirements, more modest visions of judicial power, and historical notions of
public law litigation. See also infra V.C.
16. See generally Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for
the Environment, 84 AM. J. IN'L L. 198 (1990). See also infra V.F.
17. Richard Stillwell, Greece: the Birthplace of Science and Free Speech, in EVERYDAY LIFE
iN ANciEmr TIms 185, 195 (Rhys Carpenter et al. eds., 5th ed. 1964). Sovereignty of the state
and nation is not a static concept, but constantly adapts to the needs of the times. In ancient
Greece, the city states retained the balance of power, which may have contributed to their even-
tual downfall. Although Athens and Sparta united in 490 B.C. to turn back the Persian hordes
of Darius the Great at Marathon, those leagues and alliances were merely a temporary expedi-
ency, and there was no real amalgamation of the Greek states into a federation. Eventually, the
Greek states bowed to the destruction of Lucius Mummius in 146 B.C., when Corinth was de-
stroyed for leading the states against the Roman power. Id.
18. TmE ARTIcLEs OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX, 6 2, (1781), reprinted in RoOTs oF THE
REPUBLc, 240-41 (Stephen L. Schechter ed. 1990). It was not until the drafting of the Articles
of Confederation, however, that the first pronouncements came on the issue of sovereignty.
Those disputes between the states were to be resolved through a cumbersome procedure by "the
united states in congress assembled," a right that was given to the Supreme Court in Article III
in the United States Constitution of 1787. The Articles permitted each state to retain its sover-
eignty, leaving the national government purposefully weakened, to prevent the abuses of a
strong central government which led to the Revolution. STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S.
ZAmNALuN, LAW AND AMEmCAN HIsTORY: CAsEs AND MATERiALS 139 (1980).
1993]
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Compact' 9 and the conflict between the Colonies and the British Em-
pire.' The framers of the Constitution in the Federalism debates at-
tempted to strike a balance that would provide for a strong union and
an empowered populace2 ', particularly in the debate concerning the
power of taxation" and the role of the judiciary.' This balance and
19. This supremacy of the sovereign led to the migration of the first colonists from Britain
to America, who granted to themselves the important rights of enacting their own laws and
constitutions. THE MAYFLOWER CoMPAcr, 6 2 (November 11, 1620), reprinted in Roors OF THE
REPUBLIC, (Stephen L. Schechter ed. 1990) at 22-23:
Having undertaken, for the glorie of God, and advancements of the Christian faith and
honour of our king and countrie, a vouage to plant the first Colonie in the Northern
Parts of Virginia, doe by these presents solemnly & mutualy in the presence of God,
and one of another, covenant & combine our selves togeather into a civil body politick;
for our better ordering, & preservation & furtherance of the ends aforesaid; and by
vertue hearof to enacte, constitute, and frame, shuch just & equall lawes, ordinances,
Acts, constitutions, & offices, from time to time, as shall be thought most meete &
convenient for the generall good of the Colonie: unto which we promise all due submis-
sion and obedience. (emphasis added)
20. Later, the supreme power of taxation, which flowed from the rights of the British sover-
eign, led ultimately to American independence. Bernard Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutch-
inson, in LAw AND AMERICAN HISTORY 90 (Stephen B. Presser & Jamil S. Zainaldin eds., 1980).
"Taxing? It was a necessary power of any government that sought to serve society .... Taxing
was simply an attribute of supreme authority, a mechanism necessary for its survival ... ." Id. at
92.
21. Extending jurisdiction to the judiciary in interstate disputes was not automatic. Mr.
Randolph proposed in Resolution 9 on May 29, 1787 that: "[A] National Judiciary be estab-
lished to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the
National Legislature... to hear... all.., cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States
applying to such jurisdictions may be interested .... ." DRAIrmNG THE U.S. CONSTrruTnON, at
1340-41 (Wilbourn E. Benton, ed. 1986) (emphasis added).
The issue of sovereignty was discussed on June 5, in the Committee of the Whole concern-
ing establishment of inferior tribunals under national authority. Mr. Rutledge argued a national
tribunal would infringe on the jurisdiction of the States. Mr. Madison argued "[a]n effective
Judiciary establishment commensurate to the legislative authority, was essential. A government
without a proper Executive and Judiciary would be the mere trunk of a body, without arms or
legs to act or move." Id. at 1341. On August 6, the Report of the Committee of Detail extendedjurisdiction "to controversies between two or more States .. ." for the first time. Id. at 1349.
Resolution 9 was deleted, but the language "to controversies between two or more States..
was reinserted in the present form of Art. III, § 2, cl. 1 on August 27. Id. at 1352.
22. THE FEDERALIsT No. 32, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam ed., 1982) (emphasis in
original). "There is plainly no expression in the granting clause which makes that power [of
taxation] exclusive in the Union. There is no independent clause or sentence which prohibits the
States from exercising it." Id. See also, Alexander Hamilton, An Address to the Constitutional
Convention of New York on the Subject of the Federal Constitution (1788), reprinted in 11 MOD-
ERN ELOQUENCE, at 23, 26 (Ashley H. Thorndike ed., 1923).
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 404-05 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam ed. 1982). It states:
The power of determining causes between two States... is perhaps not less essential to
the peace of the [U]nion than that which has been just examined [between the United
States and foreign nations].... Whatever practices may have a tendency to disturb the
harmony between the States are proper objects of federal superintendence and control.
Id. at 404-405.
In addition, the uniqueness of the American judicial system stands out for its ability to permit
courts to challenge the constitutionality of a particular law through an individual case or contro-
versy. I ALsXIS DE ToQUtvILLE, DEMOCRACY iN AMERICA, reprinted in Presser & Zainaldin,
supra note 20, at 274-76. De Toqueville states:
4
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the nation broke down in the war to determine whether the Union
would prevail.24 How a nation strikes the balance of power between




Jurisdiction under Article III, section 2 of the Constitution is lim-
ited to "cases" and "controversies."'  A case and controversy must be
ripe, deal with a justiciable harm, and be a question not committed to
another branch of government.26 For example, the framers did not
accept a proposal that the President and Congress obtain advisory
opinions from the Supreme Court2
2. Standing of the States
States may sue on behalf of their citizens as parens patriae to pro-
tect the general comfort, health, or property rights of their citizens
threatened by the proposed or continued action of another State.
Though it cannot present and enforce claims of their citizens as a
But the American judge is brought into the political arena independently of his own
will. He judges the law only because his is obliged to judge a case. The political ques-
tion that he is called upon to resolve is connected with the interests of the parties, and
he cannot refuse to decide it without a denial of justice. Id. at 276.
24. "To the efficiency and permanency of your Union, a government for the whole is indis-
pensable." George Washington, Farewell Address (1796), in 10 MODERN ELOQUENCE 36
(Ashley H. Thorndike ed., 1926). "Let us, then, with courage and confidence, pursue our own
federal and republican principles, our attachment to our Union and representative government."
Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (1801), MODERN ELOQUENCE, supra, at 49. "So far
as the people have restrained state sovereignty by the expression of their will, in the Constitution
of the United States, so far, it must be admitted, state sovereignty is effectually controlled."
Daniel Webster, Reply to to Hayne (Bunker Hill Oration), (1825), in MODERN ELOQUENCE,
supra, at 89. "I believe from the bottom of my soul that the measure is the reunion of the
Union." Henry Clay, Address to the Senate on the Compromise of 1850 (1850), in MODERN
ELOQUENCE, supra, at 132. "A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this govern-
ment cannot endure permanently half slave and half free." Abraham Lincoln, A House Divided
Speech, First Lincoln-Douglas Debate (1858), in MODERN ELOQUENCE, supra, at 228.
25. Supra note 1. See Nichol, supra note 15, at 1149-54 (discussing history of injury and
Article IR).
26. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 1.10, at 22 (6th ed. 1982).
27. JOHN E. NowAK, ET AL., CONSTrTUTroNAL LAW § 2.12, at 56 & n. 2 (3d ed. 1986). This
source also discusses declaratory relief, objections to advisory opinions; mootness and collusive-
ness; ripeness, prematurity, and abstractness; finality; taxpayer and citizen standing; personal
standing, nontaxpayer suits and the requirement of injury in fact; the role of Congress in creating
standing; and standing and nonconstitutional cases. Id. at 58-83. This analysis will not review
those topics.
5
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trustee against a sister State,2 under its parens patriae power, a state
may sue to protect its citizens from environmental damage2 9 "in origi-
nal actions where the injury affects the general population of a state in
a substantial way."30 In such an instance, the state is suing for an in-
jury to its soveriegn capacity and not for an injury to territory it specif-
ically owns.3'
III. JUDICIAL INTlERPRETATIONS OF STANDING
A. Overview
To understand the analysis in Wyoming of the loss of state tax
revenue as a basis for standing, it is useful to examine the three crite-
ria of standing used by the court.32 First, a state must be "directly
affected. 33 Second, a state must suffer a "real and substantial" in-
jury.34 Third, and finally, a state must have a "personal interest" at
stake to invoke the court's power. 5
B. The First Requirement: "Directly Affected"
In order for a state to have standing to sue another state, the state
must be "directly affected" by the action of the other state. 6 In
Maryland v. Louisiana,37 relied upon by the court in Wyoming, several
states, pipeline companies, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC) sought review of a Louisiana statute imposing a tax
on certain uses of natural gas brought into Louisiana from the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS).
Louisiana's tax fell on the "first use" of the gas,38 which included
the sale, transportation or processing of the gas. The tax, therefore,
28. Id. at 84, n.224 (citing North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1923); New
Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 16-20 (1900), and
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 736-39 (1981)).
29. Id. at 84 & n225 (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901)).
30. Id. at n.226 (quoting Maryland, 451 U.S. at 737).
31. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (Holmes, J.). See also NowAK,
supra note 27, at 84.
32. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 796-97 n.9 (1992).
33. Maryland v. Lousiana, 451 U.S. 725, 737 (1981).
34. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 407-08 (1939).
35. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976).
36. Wyoming, 112 S.Ct. at 796 n.9.
37. 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
38. Id. at 730-32. In 1978 the Louisiana Legislature enacted a tax of seven cents per thou-
sand cubic feet natural gas on the "first use" of any gas imported into Louisiana which was not
previously subjected to taxation by another state or the United States. The estimated annual
revenue was $150 million. Various exemptions from and credits for the tax were also allowed.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:1301-07 (West Supp. 1981). The amount of the tax equalled the
[Vol. 29:183
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was imposed upon the pipeline companies bringing the gas into Loui-
siana for processing. However, since nearly 98 percent of the gas
brought into Louisiana from the OCS went to out of state consumers,
the plaintiff states argued the tax increased costs almost exclusively to
consumers in their states.3 9 Louisiana argued the case should be dis-
missed for lack of standing because the tax was imposed on pipeline
companies and not directly on the ultimate consumers."n
The court determined the standard permitting standing was met if
the alleged injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not injury that results from the independent action of
some third party not before the court."'" The court held the plaintiff
states qualified for standing because they were considered substantial
consumers of natural gas, to whom the pipeline companies passed on
the cost of the tax with the approval of the FERC.42 While collected
at the pipeline, the tax burdened the state's consumers in a "substan-
tial and real" way, because their natural gas cost increased as a direct
result of the imposition of Louisiana's "First Use Tax."'43
C. The Second Requirement: "Real and Substantial" Injury
In order to sue another state, a state must be at risk of suffering a
"real and substantial" injury.' In Texas v. Florida,45 upon which the
Wyoming court later relied, Texas brought an action in the nature of
severance tax the State imposed on Louisiana gas producers, and was owed by the owner at the
time of the first taxable "use" within Louisiana. Id. § 1305B. The purpose of the tax was to
reimburse the people of Louisiana for damages to the State's waterbottoms, barrier islands, and
coastal areas introduced by natural gas from areas not subject to state taxes, and to compensate
for costs incurred in protecting those resources. Id. § 1301C. In addition, it was designed to
equalize competition between gas produced in Louisiana, subject to the state severance tax of
seven cents per thousand cubic feet, and gas produced elsewhere, which was not subject to the
severance tax, such as OCS gas. Id. § 1301A.
39. Maryland, 451 U.S. at 728-737. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the
"First Use Tax" was unconstitutional under- (1) the Commerce Clause, art. I, § 8, cl. 3; (2) the
Supremacy Clause, art. VI, cl. 2; (3) the Import-Export Clause, art. I, § 10, cl. 2; (4) the Impair-
ment of Contracts Clause, art. I, § 10, cl. 1; and (5) the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The statute was found to violate the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy
Clause. Id. at 734, 759.
40. Id. at 736. The Court stated under that view the alleged interests of the plaintiff States
would not fall within the type of "sovereignty" concerns justifying exercise of original jurisdic-
tion under art III, § 2, cl. 2 and 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a). Id.
41. Id.
42. Maryland, 451 U.S. at 737 & n.13. FERC consistently took the position that the tax was
unconstitutional. FERC's approval of the pass-through was expressly conditioned on the pipe-
line companies taking legal action to determine the legality of the tax and providing for refund
to the customers if it should be declared unconstitutional. Id.
43. ld.
44. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 796-97 n.9 (1992).
45. 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
7
Holmes: The Loss of State Tax Revenue As a Basis for Standing: Economy, E
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1993
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
interpleader to determine the domicile of a decedent. Texas brought
the action in order to resolve four states' claims for death taxes upon
the decedent's estate.46
In determining whether the threshold for standing was met, the
court stated that when a court of equity is asked to prevent a loss
which might otherwise result from the independent prosecution of
competing and mutually exclusive claims, the court is faced with a jus-
ticiable issue.47 That justiciable issue constitutes "case" or "contro-
versy" within the meaning of Article 111.48 Furthermore, when the
case is between states as rival claimants, with a "real and substantial"
risk of loss, the case is within the original jurisdiction of the court.49
As the court's jurisdiction arose in order to avoid the risk of loss from
the possibility of prosecution of multiple claims, the court had to as-
sess that risk.5 0 The court found that each of the four states had made
a good faith assertion that the decedent was domiciled within their
state at the time of his death.51 Each state was preparing to enforce a
lien on decedent's intangibles, which would be taking place if it were
not for the original action.52 Furthermore, the amount of the estate
was insufficient to satisfy all claims, and none of the of the four states
would consent to become a party to any of the other state's proceed-
ings to determine the right to collect the tax.53 Consequently, the
right of Texas to assert its tax lien was in jeopardy and without any
other forum for remedy. 4
D. The Third Requirement: "Personal Stake"
In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,55 the
Court denied standing to indigents and indigent organizations suing
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service for
46. Id. at 401-04.
47. Id. at 407.
48. Id.
49. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 410 (1939).
50. Id. at 410.
51. Id. at 408.
52. Id. at 408-09.
53. Id. at 409-10.
54. Texas, 306 U.S. at 410 (1939).
55. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
[Vol. 29:183
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issuing a revenue ruling allowing favorable tax treatment to a non-
profit hospital that offered only emergency-room services to indi-
gents.5 6 The indigents and organizations alleged the ruling extended
tax exempt status to those hospitals that refused indigents care other
than emergency room treatment, which plaintiffs said limited indigent
access to medical care. The Court denied standing, however, finding
that neither the individuals or the groups could allege a "personal
stake" in challenging the agency's actions.
The Court recognized the fundamental principle that the role of
the judiciary is limited to actual "cases or controversies."57 The ques-
tion "is whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-
court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers
on his behalf."58
The Court addressed separately the standing of the organizations
and individuals.5 9 With respect to the organizations, it determined
there was no injury to themselves as organizations.60 Since injury
could only be established as representatives of members injured in
fact, their interest constituted only a special interest in the health
problems of the poor, which was insufficient to establish standing.61
Continuing the analysis, the Court conceded that all the individu-
als, in one sense, suffered injury in the deprivation of access to hospi-
tal services.6' However, it determined injury "at the hands of a
hospital," was insufficient to meet the "case" or "controversy" re-
quirement because no hospitals were named as defendants. 63 Because
56. Id. The individual plaintiffs described occasions when they, or a member of their fam-
ily, had been disadvantaged in seeking needed hospital services because of indigency. Most in-
volved refusal of the hospital to admit the person because of inability to pay a deposit or
advance fee, even though enrolled in Medicare. Id. at 32-33. The complaint alleged each of the
hospitals involved had been determined by the Secretary and Commissioner to be a tax-exempt
charitable corporation, receiving substantial private contributions under 26 U.S.C § 501(c)(3).
Id. at 29. It further alleged by extending tax benefits to the hospitals, despite their refusals to
treat indigents, the defendants were "encouraging" hospitals to deny services to the individual
plaintiffs and plaintiff organizations. Plaintiffs alleged "injury in their opportunity and ability to
receive hospital services in nonprofit hospitals which receive ... benefits ... as 'charitable'
organizations" and intended beneficiaries of the Code sections granting favorable tax treatment
to "charitable organizations." Id. at 32-33.
57. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (citing
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)).
58. Id. at 38 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)).
59. Id. at 40-46.
60. Id. at 40.
61. Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)).
62. Id.
63. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976).
11993]
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only the Department of Treasury was named,' the Court held the in-
jury was the independent action of a third party not before the Court,
and thus was insufficient to establish standing.65
Second, the Court found that by only "encouraging" hospitals to
deny services to indigents through the revenue ruling, it was "purely
speculative" whether the denial of services could be traced to such
actions instead of decisions made by the hospital without regard to tax
implications.66 Equally speculative was whether the remedial powers
of the Court would result in the availability of hospital services to in-
jured individuals.67
IV. WYOMING V. OKLAHOMA
A. Statement of the Case
The dispute between the two states began when Wyoming peti-
tioned the United States Supreme Court to assume original jurisdic-
tion.68 The complaint challenged an Oklahoma statute requiring coal-
fired electric generating plants producing power for intrastate sale to
64. Id. at 41.
65. Id. at 41-42.
66. Id. at 42-43.
67. Id. at 43.
68. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 793-94 (1992). The court granted Wyoming per-
mission to file the complaint to invoke original jurisdiction. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
1231 (1988). Oklahoma filed a motion to dismiss, asserting Wyoming lacked standing, which the
court denied and ordered Oklahoma to answer Wyoming's complaint within 30 days. Wyoming
v. Oklahoma, 488 U.S. 921 (1988). The Court then appointed a Special Master. Wyoming v.
Oklahoma 489 U.S. 1063 (1989). Each party requested summary judgment. Wyoming argued
the Act was a per se violation of the Commerce Clause. Oklahoma argued that the Act was
constitutional, Wyoming had no standing, and original jurisdiction was improper. Id. The Spe-
cial Master recommended conclusions of law. He found that Wyoming had standing and original
jurisdiction was appropriate. The second conclusion of law was the that Act facially and effec-
tively discriminated against interstate commerce because Oklahoma failed to demonstrate any
legitimate purpose for the statute. The final recommendation of the Report to the Court was
made in the alternative. The first alternative was that the court dismiss the action, without preju-
dice to Wyoming, as it related to an Oklahoma-owned utility, the Grand River Dam Authority
(hereinafter GRDA). The second alternative was to find the Act severable to the extent it con-
stitutionally applied to GRDA. Id. The parties requested adoption of the Special Master's Re-
port and contained conclusions of law. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 111 S.Ct. 2822 (1991). The court
denied the requests and set the case for oral argument because constitutionality of the Act was
in question. Id. The court adopted, with one exception, the recommended findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the Special Master.
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burn a mixture of at least 10 percent Oklahoma-mined coal. 69 Wyo-
ming asked the Court to declare that the statute violated the Com-
merce Clause and to enjoin permanently enforcement of the Act.7 °
The Court granted the injunction.7'
B. Facts
The facts of the case demonstrate the conflicting economic inter-
ests of the two sovereign states. Wyoming is a major coal-producing
state which in 1988 shipped coal to 19 other states72 including
Oklahoma.73 Oklahoma was Wyoming's third largest out-of-state
consumer, purchasing eight percent of Wyoming's total coal produc-
tion.74 Because Wyoming imposed a severance tax upon coal ex-
tracted within its boundaries,75 it collected taxes on coal extracted by
eight mining companies that sold to four utility companies in
Oklahoma.7 6
In June 1985, the Oklahoma Legislature adopted a concurrent
resolution with the explicit goal of spurring local economic develop-
ment and retaining ratepayers' dollars in Oklahoma. 77 The legislature
requested Oklahoma utility companies which used coal-fired generat-
ing plants to consider plans to blend 10 percent Oklahoma coal with
69. Wyoming, 112 S. Ct. at 793 n.1.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 804.
72. Wyoming, 112 S. Ct. at 794.
73. Id. at 794 n.3.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Wyo. STAT. §§ 39-6-301 to 39-6-308 (1990 and Supp. 1991)). The tax is as-
sessed against the extractor and is payable upon extraction at fair market value. Id.
76. Id. The eight mining companies that sell to the four Oklahoma utilities were not parties
to the dispute.
77. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. CL 789,794 n.3 (1992). S. Res. 21, 1985 Okla. Sess. Laws
1694 states in relevant part:
WHEREAS, the use of Oklahoma coal would save significant freight charges on out-
of-state coal from the State of Wyoming, and
WHEREAS, the coal-fired electric plants being used by Oklahoma utilities are exclu-
sively using Wyoming coal; and
WHEREAS, the Oklahoma ratepayers are paying $300 million annually for Wyoming
coal; and
WHEREAS, a 1982 Ozark Council Report states that $9 million of the ratepayers dol-
lars was paid as severance tax to the State of Wyoming ....
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED...:
THAT Oklahoma utilities using coal-fired generating plants seriously consider using a
blend of at least ten percent Oklahoma coal with Wyoming coal and continue to meet
air quality standards.
THAT the result of such a blend would assure at least a portion of the ratepayer dollars
remaining in Oklahoma and enhancing the economy of the State of Oklahoma.
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the Wyoming coal. 78 No plant heeded the resolution.79 In response,
the legislature passed the Act mandating 10 percent minimum
purchase of Oklahoma coal.8" A year passed without compliance. 81
Consequently, the Oklahoma Legislature adopted a concurrent reso-
lution which directed GRDA, as a state-owned public utility, to com-
ply with the Act.82
Prior to the Act, the utilities purchased nearly 100 percent of
their coal from sources in Wyoming from 1981 to 1984.3 These
purchases increased in 1985 and 1986 after adoption of Oklahoma
Senate Resolution 21. 4 The utilities reduced purchases of Wyoming
coal in favor of Oklahoma coal after the Act became effective on Jan-
uary 1, 1987.85 Wyoming estimated that it lost severance taxes in 1987
of $535,866; in 1988 of $542,352; and $87,130 in the first four months
of 1989.86 Wyoming had an excess mining capacity? This formed the
basis for the argument to the court that the excess could not be sold
78. Id.
79. Id. The four affected utilities in Oklahoma included three that are privately owned: the
Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company, Public Services Company of Oklahoma, and Western




82. Wyoming, 112 S. Ct. at 795 n. 5. See S. Res. 82, 1988 Okla. Sess. Laws 1915:
WHEREAS, the passage of this law in 1986 has provided over 700 new jobs in
Oklahoma's coal-mining industry and related employment sectors; and
WHEREAS, another benefit of this law is an additional $31 million of taxable income
has been generated through the purchases of Oklahoma mined coal; and
WHEREAS the Grand River Dam Authority has failed to comply with said law and
has refused to recognize the intent of the Oklahoma State Legislature to utilize
Oklahoma mined coal,
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED...:
THAT the Oklahoma State Legislature hereby directs the Grand River Dam Authority
to immediately begin purchasing Oklahoma mined coal and to comply with the law as
stated in [the Act].
83. Id. (citing Report of the Special Master 7-8). While the Oklahoma coal has a higher
BTU rating than Wyoming coal, because of its higher sulfur content the Oklahoma coal does not
burn as cleanly as Wyoming coal and causes more pollution. Id. at n. 7.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Wyoming, 112 S. Ct. at 795, n.6. The court observed Oklahoma did not contradict these
estimates. Its expert emphasized Wyoming experienced a more severe loss in severance tax
revenues due both to its reduction of the severance tax rate and a decline in coal market prices.
This testimony was construed by the court to mean the Oklahoma position suggested the esti-
mate of lost severance tax was too high, indicating Wyoming did not provide 100% of coal
purchased. Id. However, the dissent argued that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to
Wyoming's injury-in-fact. Id. at 805-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. Wyoming, 112 S. Ct. at 795, n.6 & n.8. The Director of the Wyoming Department of
Environmental Quality stated that as of 1987, the permitted capacity in the Powder River Basin
was 318 million tons, whereas total production from all mines was 146.5 million tons. Id.
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elsewhere to compensate for the loss of severance taxes derived from
purchases by Oklahoma importers.88
C. Standing
The test for invoking original jurisdiction may be met in two
ways. 9 The first is whether one state has been wronged by another,
furnishing grounds for redressability. The second is by asserting a
right susceptible of judicial enforcement according to accepted juris-
prudential principles of common law or equity. Both were met by
Wyoming.90 The first test was met because Wyoming alleged harm
from the loss of severance taxes directly caused by passage of the
Act.91 The second part was met by Congress granting authority to the
Supreme Court to resolve disputes between states.'
The court adopted the determination of the Special Master that
Wyoming's complaint satisfied the requirements for the court to grant
standing. Wyoming alleged a real and substantial harm (i.e. loss of tax
revenue) caused directly by the Oklahoma statute.93
In footnote nine of the opinion, the court explained its rationale
for deciding the loss of severance tax revenues constituted a direct
injury:
We note as well that the recitals in Oklahoma's initial concurrent
resolution reflect that coal-fired electric plants within Oklahoma
were exclusively using Wyoming coal, with the attendant recogni-
tion that "$9 million of the ratepayers dollars was paid as severance
tax to the State of Wyoming." Res. 21. The Wyoming coal that
would have been sold - but no longer will be sold due to the Act - to
Oklahoma utilities by a Wyoming producer is subject to the tax
when extracted. Wyoming, which stands to regain these lost reve-
nues should its suit to overturn the Act succeed, is thus "directly
affected in a 'substantial and real' way so as to justify exercise of
this Court's original jurisdiction., 94
88. Id.
89. Wyoming v. Oklahoma 112 S. Ct. 789, 796 (1992).
90. Id. (citing Report of Special Master).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 796 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)).
93. Id. ("The coal that, in the absence of the Act, would have been sold to Oklahoma utili-
ties by a Wyoming producer would have been subject to the tax when extracted. Wyoming's loss
of severance tax revenues 'fairly can be traced' to the Act.").
94. Id. at 796-97 n. 9 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, Texas v. Florida, and Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, discussed supra sec. IV.).
1993]
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Furthermore, the court rejected the argument by Oklahoma that
Wyoming was not engaged in the commerce or affected as a con-
sumer, and therefore lacked the type of direct injury cognizable in a
Commerce Clause action.95 Authorities cited by Oklahoma involved
claims of parens patriae standing rather than allegations of direct in-
jury to the State itself.9 6 A similar argument was rejected by the court
in Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 7 in which a statu-
tory agency had standing to challenge a discriminatory North Carolina
apple grading system as violative of the Commerce Clause.98 It deter-
mined Hunt supported Wyoming's standing against Oklahoma "where
its severance tax revenues are directly linked to the extraction and
sale of coal and have been demonstrably affected by the Act."99
D. Minority Opinion on Standing
The minority disagreed that a state had standing on the basis of
consequential loss of tax revenue.1°° Three reasons supported the mi-
nority's conclusion,1 1 but only two are important to our analysis.
First, there was no injury in fact.' °2 Second, the dissenting opinion
stated Wyoming was not within the "zone of interest" constitutionally
protected under the negative Commerce Clause.10 3
1. Injury in Fact
The question of whether Wyoming would have sold coal in addi-
tion to that diverted from the lost sales to Oklahoma purchasers led
95. Id. at 797.
96. d (citing, Oklahoma v. A., T., & S.F.R. Co., 220 U.S. 277, 287-89 (1911)(refusing to
accept jurisdiction because the State of Oklahoma did not ship goods in its governmental capac-
ity, finding the real controversy was between the railway company and certain Oklahoma citi-
zens who shipped by rail); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 16-22 (1900)(refusing to accept
jurisdiction when a Texas State Health Officer placed a quarantine on all goods imported from
New Orleans because of fear of yellow fever outbreaks)).
97. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
98. Id In Hunt, the Commission, a statutory agency designed to promote and protect the
Washington State apple industry, was composed of 13 growers and dealers from electoral dis-
tricts by their peers, all of whom paid mandatory assessments to finance its operations. The
direct injury requirement was met because the "contraction of the market for Washington apples
*.. could reduce the amount of the assessments due the Commission and used to support its
activities." Id. at 341, 345.
99. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 798 (1992).
100. Wyoming, 112 S.Ct. at 804 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing the historical roots of the "nega-
tive Commerce Clause" from Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 58 U.S. (12
How.) 299 (1852)).
101. IdL at 805-807.
102. Id. at 806.
103. Id. at 808.
[Vol. 29:183
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 29 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol29/iss1/5
WYOMING v. OKLAHOMA
the minority to question if a genuine issue of material fact remained,
making the case unsuitable for a summary judgment.104 The majority
reaffirmed the burden of the injured party to show injury on the basis
of concrete facts.105 However, the minority was not satisfied that it
was an indisutable fact that Wyoming had lost tax revenues specifi-
cally as a result of the Oklahoma statute.10 6
The test for injury in fact, the minority said, was not merely
whether the Act "caused Oklahoma sales to be lost," but whether it
prevented Wyoming "severances" of coal from occuring.1°7 Analyti-
cally, the minority saw two possible rationales for connecting sales loss
with tax loss.'08 The one adopted by the majority was that "excess
mining capacity" was generated by the loss of sales to Oklahoma. The
minority posited that an issue existed of whether the loss in sales and
concurrent loss in tax revenue was because of Wyoming's coal produc-
tion outstripping demand.10 9 Consequently, there has been no loss of
tax revenue, simply a general loss in sales not directly tied to
Oklahoma's act.n ° For this reason the minority contended summary
judgment stage was not the appropriate place to weigh the evidence to
determine whether there was an injury in fact."'
2. Zone of Interest
Assuming, arguendo, that Wyoming was injured in fact, the dis-
senting opinion concluded it still lacked standing because it was not
within the "zone of interest" protected by the negative Commerce
Clause."' Historically, the negative Commerce Clause was intended
to protect the national free market." 3 Free trade among the states is
104. Id
105. Id at 806 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)(burden on party
seeking jurisdiction to establish injury); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504-05 (1975) ("specific,
concrete facts" required to show injury); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 396 U.S. 144, 157
(1970)(requiring "no genuine issue" under FED. R. Civ. P. 56(C) for summary judgment to be
granted); and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986) (denial of motion if
reasonable minds differ)).
106. Id
107. Id. (emphasis in original).
108. Id. at 807.
109. Wyoming v. Oklahoma 112 S. Ct. 789, 797 (1992).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 807-08 (citing Air Courier Conference of America v. American Postal Workers'
Union, 498 U.S. 517,524 (1991) and Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318,320-
21 n. 3 (1977) (applying zone of interest test to negative Commerce Clause)).
113. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 808 (citing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond,
336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949)).
1993]
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constitutionally protected to benefit those engaged in interstate
commerce.
114
The minority argued the interests of the coal companies under
this analysis would pass the zone of interest test.115 However, the
right of Wyoming to collect taxes was only "marginally related" to
standing.11 6 The minority argued the Court's rationale would open
the door to every state taxing interest as potentially falling within the
realm of the Commerce Clause.117 More importantly, an outright
abandonment of the zone of interest test in favor of a de facto causal-
ity test would result in a marked increase in Commerce Clause suits
between states. 18
V. ANALYSIS1 1 9
This analysis will first address the struggle between the economic
interests of the states and the Commerce Clause. Second, it will re-
view the goal of efficient energy consumption on the part of the state
and federal governments. Third, it will address the environmental
repercussions arising from using the loss of state tax revenue as a basis
for standing in interstate disputes. Finally, it states that in accordance
with the principles of "generational equity," the competing interests
must be synthesized in a policy which will meet the needs of future
generations. The loss of state tax revenue as a "procedural" basis for
114. Id. (citing Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tlly, 466 U.S. 388, 402-03 (1984); Dennis v.
Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 460 (1991)).
115. Id. at 809.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 809-10. The dissent stated:
Of course, if the state interest in collecting severance taxes does fall within the zone of
interests of the Commerce Clause, so must every other state taxing interest. The zone-
of-interest test, as opposed to the injury-in-fact requirement, turns on the type of inter-
est asserted and not on its speculativeness or its degree of attenuation from its alleged
source. The injury-in-fact requirement, of course, will still remain "but if and when de
facto causality can be established, every diminution of state revenue attributable to the
allegedly unconstitutional commercial regulation of a sister State will now be the basis
for a lawsuit. Suits based on loss of sales tax revenue ought to become a regular phe-
nomenon, since it is no more difficult to show that an automatic sales tax was lost on a
particular sale than it is to show that the severance tax was lost here. Further expan-
sions of standing (or irrational distinctions) lurk just around the corner" if a State has a
litigable interest in the taxes that would have been paid upon an unconstitutionally
obstructed sale, there is no reasonable basis for saying that a company salesman does
not have a litigable interest in the commissions that would have been paid, or a union in
the wages that would have been earned.
118. Id. at 810 (citing Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 536 (1983)("The judicial remedy cannot encompass every conceivable harm that can be
traced to alleged wrongdoing.").
119. I intentionally departed from more traditional law review practice and left the following
analysis in essay form.
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standing in interstate disputes must be balanced with the "substan-
tive" policy issues to ensure that courts strike a proper balance in the
resolution of the disputes.
A. Economic Interests of the States and the Commerce Clause
The issue of sovereignty remains a strong undercurrent in the bal-
ancing of the economic interests of states and in the Commerce
Clause's restriction against affecting interstate commerce. The first
sovereignty issue is the fundamental struggle between the federal and
state governments, resolved in favor of the federal interest by the
Supremacy Clause. The second issue is an economic struggle over
whether an individual state will prosper at the expense of a sister
state.
An analysis of the supremacy aspect of the cases is instructive.
The previous decisions in Maryland, Texas, and Simon were relied on
by the Court in Wyoming to justify its ruling that standing may be
based on the loss of state tax revenue. However, in Maryland, the
direct conflict between the federal and state sovereign interests is not
explicit. It is implied by the invocation of the Commerce Clause
against an Louisia's discriminatory "first use" tax statute. Nor is there
a direct conflict between federal and state interests in Texas. In Simon
there was no issue of supremacy, since the dispute concerned federal
tax law and private hospitals"leaving the state out of the picture en-
tirely. Wyoming paralleled Maryland in its treatment of sovereignty
issue.
The next issue is whether one state may profit at the expense of a
sister state. Again, the issue is not present in Simon. A distinction
may be drawn, however, between Texas and the cases of Maryland
and Wyoming. Texas involved the competing interests of states to de-
termine which had the superior nexus that would permit collection of
taxes from the decedent's estate. There was no inherently discrimina-
tory aspect. A common aspect of Maryland and Wyoming, however,
may be termed a "line of demarcation." In both cases the United
States Supreme Court found that the statutes sought to unconstitu-
tionally discriminate between home state and sister state by distin-
guishing between them simply on the basis of being a different
sovereign state.
While the legislation in both cases arguably sought to equalize the
economic strength of the sister states, they both did so in a way that
focused on the apparent disparate treatment of in-state and out-of-
1993]
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state interests. This economic disparity is not per se rejected, but
rather must yield to the Commerce Clause prohibition when there is
no other legitimate state reason other than simple economic
protectionism.
B. Efficient Energy Consumption
The goal of efficient energy consumption is certainly one which
would benefit the nation, states, and citizens of this country. In Mary-
land and Wyoming, however, the issue of energy efficiency is conspic-
uously absent from the state's statutes. But if the state statutes of
Louisiana and Oklahoma had addressed energy efficiency as a legiti-
mate purpose for the statute, perhaps the outcome of the cases would
have been different.
Merely seeking parity with other taxes, as in Maryland, or seek-
ing to retain revenues in-state, as in Wyoming, is insufficient to over-
come the presumption of unconstitutionality of disparate treatment.
However, if a statute were to use energy conservation as its purpose,
and then give tax benefits to those who reach this stated goal, then the
court would likely uphold the validity of the legislative enactment.
One could envision such a statute giving incentives to individuals who
reduce energy consumption in the household setting, which of course
would be limited to those who reside within the state. Conferring a
benefit on the citizens of the state, however, would not be unconstitu-
tional because the legislative purpose is not by nature discriminatory.
But, a producing state which lost tax revenue as a result of another
state's incentives could sue, arguing for standing based on Wyoming.
In addition, a similar statute granting incentives to corporate entities
that encourage energy conservation would survive the test of constitu-
tionality by treating providers of energy from all states with a similar
tax benefit or economic incentive. But would a state now hesitate to
enact such incentives, for fear of retailiation by a sister state who indi-
rectly lost tax revenue?
Another issue: both statutes in Maryland and Wyoming focused
on energy sources, natural gas in Maryland and coal in Wyoming. The
focus in Maryland was to seek parity, through the imposition of the
"First Use Tax" between Louisiana-produced natural gas and that gas
imported from out-of-state. The court treated the plaintiff States as
consumers for purposes of standing, but the statute in question and
the opinion did not address how to make the consumption of energy
more efficient for the ultimate consumer. In Wyoming the legislative
[Vol. 29:183
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enactments addressed costs to Oklahoma ratepayers, revenue paid to
Wyoming, and potential effect on Oklahoma jobs because of the
purchase of in-state coal. But again there is no explicit mention of
how to consume less energy. The focus is primarily on the loss of
revenue that flowed out-of-state to Wyoming.
The question was not raised in either case whether a legitimate
state interest would be served in furtherance of a state energy policy.
Though Commerce Clause analysis would hinge on the discriminatory
treatment between the promulgating state and other states, it would
make the analysis more difficult to resolve if the statute did not pro-
vide a "line of demarcation," but nonetheless resulted in a loss of state
severance taxes as in Wyoming. The effect would be to bring the pro-
cedural aspect of standing into play as a critical factor in determining
whether the substantive complaint would suffice for invoking original
jurisdiction.
The question may be raised whether Oklahoma could have man-
dated natural gas consumption by utilities, with a stated goal to reduce
pollution. Natural gas is an important Oklahoma industry and burns
cleaner than coal. If the purpose would be to reduce pollution, then it
may be found not to violate the negative Commerce Clause. Any in-
crease to Oklahoma's economy and detriment to Wyoming's economy
would be incidental to the main purpose of the statute. The difficulty
with maintaining this position, however, is that it eliminates the possi-
bility of permitting other technology-forcing improvements for fuels
other than natural gas. The better approach would be to set a specific
level of pollution reduction to be targeted as the environmental goal
and then let the competing industries seek to attain it. Such an ap-
proach would be consistent with the "free market" rationale cited by
the minority in its zone of interest analysis.
C. Environmental Repercussions
The specific environmental repercussions arising from loss of
state tax revenue as a basis for standing in interstate disputes are
demonstrated in Maryland and Wyoming. The environmental reper-
cussions in Maryland were that the state was not able to use the reve-
nues from the "First Use Tax" for protection of the waterbottoms,
barrier islands, and coastal islands because of the discriminatory effect
of the statute on interstate commerce. In Wyoming, the environmen-
tal repercussion was that instead of using Oklahoma coal and poten-
tially increasing air pollution because of sulphur emissions, the cleaner
1993]
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burning Wyoming coal was not only protected through the extraction
tax, but essentially preferred as the fuel of choice. These were the
practical effects of the decisions.
Once again, neither case was decided on environmental grounds.
But the difficulty for the future is how a state may pass environmental
laws intended to reduce pollution which could have a discriminatory
effect on interstate commerce in a manner giving rise to standing
before the court after Wyoming.
In Maryland, Louisiana passed its statute specifically to compen-
sate the people of that state for damages to waterbottoms, barrier is-
lands, and the coastal areas introduced by drilling for natural gas from
federal OCS lands. This interest was not the deciding factor in the
case, as the court focused instead on the discriminatory imposition of
the "First Use Tax." Validity of the statute was not discussed. Left
unresolved in the case is how a state may seek to fund a policy of
protection of the environment, in a way that consequently affects in-
terstate commerce. Clearly, the substantive issue of the environment
yielded to the financial interests of sister states under the Commerce
Clause analysis as standing was granted to pursue the issue.
In Wyoming, environmental issues were not discussed. Once
again, while air quality would be better with Wyoming coal rather
than its Oklahoma counterpart, that was not the main focus of the
opinion. Again, it hinged on the discrimination resulting from the line
of demarcation between Oklahoma coal and Wyoming coal. It is in-
teresting to consider how a different situation would be handled. For
example, what if state A produces and bums a cleaner type of coal
than state B and passes legislation requiring coal burned within it to
meet the air quality standards of state A. This brings into play the
discussion raised by McCarty in the conflict between the Clean Air
Act and the dormant Commerce Clause, which is at the heart of his
analysis and the essence of the problem.2 0
If the Oklahoma law had been motivated by environmental,
rather than economic interests, the outcome of the case may have
been different. The legitimate purpose of environmental protection
could have resulted in passage of a valid statute that would have sur-
vived the test of constitutionality. But even such an enactment would
need to be carefully phrased to avoid a similar pitfall. If the air qual-
ity for the state were to meet a more stringent level of purity, then it
120. Supra note 14.
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would be constitutional. Then all entities would be required to com-
ply with the directive, by whatever means that entity determines most
feasible. Again, the pivotal factor is whether there is a selective im-
pact of the statute. Thus, the test would seem to be whether all enti-
ties would be required to meet the environmental standard, or
whether others would be arbitrarily granted an exception solely on the
basis of status.
In contrast, consider a situation where the opposite result may
occur. For example, a state may wish to encourage its agencies to seek
measures to encourage energy efficiency and determine whether the
fuel source meets those criteria. This would lead to an energy source
selection process, through which a determination could be made to
assess the potential environmental impacts of the particular fuel. Im-
position of such a process would likely be upheld, and in the case of
Oklahoma and natural gas, may lead to incidental discrimination and
increased local state revenues. But more suspect would be the exclu-
sion of specific fuel sources. A better way of mandating such choices
would be to allow agencies to assess impacts of the alternatives.
E. Dissent Opinion
Specifically, the minority opinion took issue with the decision
that it was permissible to recognize the standing of a state to bring a
negative Commerce Clause action on the basis of its consequential
loss of tax revenue. The dissent noted there was no clear showing of
injury in fact, and Wyoming, as a taxing entity and not a market par-
ticipant, was not within the zone of interest protected under the nega-
tive Commerce Clause.
From a policy perspective, the dissent's injury in fact argument
makes the most sense. The difficulty of tracing the loss of revenue
from the discriminatory impact of a particular statute or act can be
tenuous and uncertain. Furthermore, the conjecture of interplay be-
tween supply and demand would operate to further obscure the fac-
tual determination of the injury. Theoretically, this could lend itself to
a "forum shopping" analogy whereby statistical comparison, an of-
fended state could track all legislative pronouncements of sister states
of any kind which may have an impact within its borders, and then
challenge those which have the best chance of success. But this is held
in check by the fact that the Oklahoma statute was specifically di-
rected against Wyoming coal. Regardless of whether another state is
specifically mentioned in legislation which becomes law, the court will
19931
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look beyond the words of the statute to the effect of the law in ques-
tion. Courts would be well advised to limit such controversies to those
which either specifically mention another state, give preferential treat-
ment to intrastate sources, or have an irrefutable and traceable effect
on another state.
F. Generational Equity
The economic interests of the states, efficient energy consump-
tion, and the environmental considerations are all significant issues
which must be addressed. They do not exist in isolation, but rather
are interrelated and should be treated that way in state and federal
legislation and before the courts.
With respect to the state and federal legislation, the enactments
will continue to deal with the problems of insufficient revenue and
energy, and environmental protection, all the while in pursuit of their
competing sovereign interests. Perhaps that is the best forum to grap-
ple with these complex problems. Of necessity, however, the courts,
as has been demonstrated, are limited to the "case" or "controversy"
provisions of Article III of the Constitution. Courts have considerable
impact upon the ability of the states, in particular, to attempt to re-
solve these problems. The role of the courts is simply part of the sys-
tem of checks and balances inherent in our separation of powers.
Standing plays an integral role in dealing with policy issues facing
our society. The relevance of standing to the Supremacy Clause and
the subject of generation equity deserves further explanation.
Resolution of societal problems occurs at various levels. Dis-
putes may be dealt with by individuals without access to any of the
three branches of federal government, state government, or municipal
authorities. But the structural problems which give rise to these
problems are usually addressed by the federal government, even if the
solutions may not, in every instance, result in a desired change in daily
living for its citizens. Because of the supremacy of the federal govern-
ment, it is at that level most of these policy decisions are made.
The judiciary has evolved to form the cutting edge of policy on a
national scale, sometimes eclipsing legislative and executive pro-
nouncements. This is the forum in practice, if not of choice.
Against this background, it is in the courts that one must first
maintain the foothold to be heard, or to obtain standing. That crucial
stepping stone must first be met in order to address these pressing
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issues. Those issues include those of an economic impact, energy effi-
ciency, and environmental protection, among others. As a "check and
balance," standing operates to provide citizens an additional level of
accountability and review of policy decisions. The role standing plays,
of gatekeeper to the courts, is a significant one which determines
which policy issues will be heard and decided.
Whether generational equity is addressed, therefore, may be de-
termined by access to the courts. The concept is not merely an aca-
demic topic of responsibility to ensure opportunities for financial
success and health of future generations. It is more. From a societal
perspective notions of generational equity include decisions concern-
ing the environment and energy consumption which have a direct im-
pact on the world in which we live. The final decision for access to the
forum of the courts through standing, in effect, has a direct impact on
which issues of the day are addressed and decided.
Regardless of how the problems are resolved, the critical point is
that each generation has a responsibility to solve them and live
responsibly during the time of their inhabitance of this planet. Eco-
nomics is important because it is essential to survival of the republic.
Energy efficiency is important because the resources that permit the
mobility and sophistication of civilization are dependent upon fuels to
make it possible. Of course, the importance of the environment as an
ecosystem which supports us all is the mainstay of our shared lives.
VI. CONCLUSION
Review of the loss of state tax revenue as a "procedural" basis for
standing in interstate disputes must be balanced with "substantive"
policy issues to ensure that the courts strike a proper balance, keeping
with the concept of "generational equity."
The "procedural" basis of the loss of tax revenue as providing
standing in interstate disputes will fall into one of two categories. In
the first category are those interests which are not discriminatory.
This catagory would give the most uncertainty to the process of judi-
cial review, as suggested in the dissent in Wyoming. The second cate-
gory would include those statutes, such as were the subject of review
in Wyoming and Maryland, that set forth a specific line of demarca-
tion or disparate treatment of the states which gave rise to standing.
At some point on the spectrum, the traceability of the loss of tax reve-
nue would reach a point where it could not be attributed to the spe-
cific legislative act. While this problem is not wholly resolved in
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Wyoming, the proof of traceability could occur, though with great dif-
ficulty, in an instance where there was less than 100 percent reliance
upon a sister state for a commodity or resource. That near total reli-
ance and specific legislative action to reduce it contributed to the
strength of Wyoming's successful argument that it had standing.
The "substantive" issues at play in Wyoming, Maryland, Texas,
and Simon go hand-in-hand with the "procedural" issue of standing.
Whether resolving Oklahoma's attempt to require certain utilities to
burn 10 percent indigenous coal, Louisiana's statute to protect its en-
vironmental resources, Texas' desire to receive death taxes in the dis-
pute of the domicile of a wealthy resident, or indigents and indigent
organizations fight for hospital services, the impact of standing on so-
ciety reaches beyond the boundaries of the individual states and the
individual case.
What must be achieved is a balance. Standing in interstate dis-
putes is only a threshold for the consideration of the "case" or "con-
troversy." The policy issues at stake must also be considered so the
society that governed by the law of the judicial pronouncements ulti-
mately improves the lives of its citizens, commensurate with its re-
sponsibility as a sovereign.
It is not an easy task. To confront the economic, energy, and en-
vironmental responsibilities of our society is not a pleasant duty. To
so confront requires looking to a record of activities that have not
always been the best or right decision. It is also tempting to merely
drift through the more mundane problems that present themselves for
immediate resolution. Our duty is to do more. The same foresight
and planning which resulted in the strength of this country must be
called upon again to re-visit these enormous tasks. With increased
technology comes new knowledge which requires new action. By
looking into the future, one can reach these horizons.
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